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FORESIGHT AS A PRELUDE TO POLICY RESOLUTION: 
THE MEXICO STUDY 
Robert Looney 
Several years ago I did a forecast of the Mexican 
economy for the Bank of Mexico. This was at a time when 
Mexico experienced financial crises (perhaps approached 
bankruptcy) and had to declare a moratorium on debt payment 
and seek special assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund. The concerns of this conference with national 
planning as it relates to global foresight are extremely 
appropriate in the case of Mexico because Mexico has been 
incorporated into the world economy with the phenomenon of 
the oil price boom and the increases in international 
interest rates. I think Mexico might be said to be 
especially vulnerable to developments in those markets. In 
particular, Mexicans have been integrated into the world 
economy with its capital flows to the extent that interest 
rate increases and events in the world economy are very 
critical in determining the ability of the Mexican 
government to finance its debt and to service it. One 
percentage point of change costs Mexico about 800 million 
dollars a year, so they are quite sensitive to these types 
of international fluctuation. 
The model that we used for the Bank of America 
forecast had several features; I will not dwell upon all of 
its technical points. Unfortunately when we were looking 
at general approaches, one model that wasn't mentioned was 
the employing of world project link models capable of 
linking the Mexican economy to world oil markets and 
capital flows. Clearly Mexican growth is also linked with 
other countries; for example, interactions between U.S. 
economic growth and Mexican exports are extremely important 
in assessing Mexican growth prospects. Needless to say the 
Bank of America forecasts were way over the mark because 
they could not assess what the impact of the U.S. recession 
was upon the Mexican economy. Another study (for the Bank 
of Mexico) incorporates some of the world variables into 
the framework. More importantly, social variables were 
also introduced to determine if the International Monetary 
Fund imposed some fairly severe austerity programs on 
Mexico. This marked a kind of benchmark in terms of what 
Mexico would agree to negotiate with the International 
Monetary Fund in terms of reducing government expenditures 
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or raising taxes. 
Thus the Bank of Mexico model incorporated all of 
these things and it marked a great event in world economy 
planning because it incorporated world developments from 
other models and feedback loops from government actions 
in terms of what would happen in the near term, and 
showed how those feedbacks affected the ability of the 
government to carry out an austerity program. We are all 
well aware that most countries were forced to austerity 
programs in the past by the International Monetary Fund 
and faced overwhelming problems: food riots in Egypt, 
more recent food riots in the Dominican Republic, in-
stability and unrest in Jamaica, etc. Therefore, when it 
came to the case of Mexico, the International Monetary 
Fund and the Bank of Mexico were both interested in 
examining the possibility of extending the date when the 
austerity measures would be imposed and, more important-
ly, attempting to determine if some kind of compromise 
between the immediate need for austerity to restore 
financial stability and the necessity to maintain a 
stable internal environment could be achieved. If so, 
then it might be possible to proceed with the austerity 
program without tremendous urban unrest and serious 
difficulties in terms of various groups and regions being 
alienated from the government program, clearly increasing 
the likelihood of the program's success. 
It was therefore decided that the optimal control 
program would survey alternative patterns over time--this 
was a five year time period--from 1983 to 1988. The 
objective of the model was to optimize the country's 
growth in the context of a series of feedback loops 
Initially, therefore, we tried to visualize what th~ 
country's growth patterns would be without austerity--to 
see if that was a feasible growth path. Next we examined 
the impact of the International Monetary Fund on a 
normal, severe austerity program which drastically 
slashes government expenditure. Would there be a major 
fallout in the economy? Negative rates of growth for a 
period of time? Increasing unemployment and urban and 
social unrest? 
Operationally, the model indicated what form of 
stabilization growth path would lead to inflation, 
increased unemployment, etc. Once political constraints 
were manifested in terms of some sort of minimal rate of 
growth with subsequent employment creation, the model 
examined what the political constraints were in terms of 
achieving some sort of agriculture production for basic 
food needs and the like. It also examined the limits to 
the short-term cutback of government expenditures for 
austerity purposes, while keeping the economy on a growth 
path which would allow (in the long run) a servicing of 
the debt and a return to a level of balance of payments 
which would again maintain the currency on an even keel, 
and achieve the normal objectives of IMF stabilization 
programs. 
Interestingly enough, the model showed that if the 
austerity program was not implemented by the 
International Monetary Fund, the economy would be unable 
to maintain positive rates of growth over a period of 
time because of lack of support from the international 
financial community. There would be basic drying-up of 
loans; banks would call in loans and resort · to other 
panic measures because of a lack of confidence in the 
ability of the government to keep the balance of payments 
within line • 
One permutation of the model looked at the initial 
International Monetary Fund proposal, which was a cutback 
in the government deficit--as a proportion of GNP--of 
from 16% in 1983 down to 2.5% in 1985. This represented 
a severe cutback in government expenditure and what it 
displayed was a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
The prospect was that, if implemented, there would be a 
negative growth in the Mexican economy for about two 
years. Politically this was unacceptable, and once again 
the government was unwilling to agree to this type of 
program. On the other hand, the government had a diffi-
cult problem because they desperately needed IMF finan-
cial assistance. A paper presented at the conference 
last year by Mr. Hopkins talked about the problems 
associated with the basic International Monetary approach 
to stabilization--which is to be a massive devaluation 
followed by a lid on government expenditure. The usual 
result is along the lines outlined above: increased 
unemployment, reduced standards of living and finally 
civil unrest. This quite often results in the ultimate 
abandoning of the program, with no real gains to show for 
the economic loss imposed on the country. 
In the light of the above expectations we attempted 
to model the economy for alternate compromises, trying to 
work in supply-side effects as much as possible, looking 
at some of the feedback from a stable-level government 
expenditure, and suggesting a recovery of private expen-
diture which would increase the level of our previous 
government revenues. The conclusion was obvious, the 
model indicated a range overlap between the priorities of 
the government for political-social stability with 
positive rates of growth, and the concern on the part of 
the International Monetary Fund to protect the interna-
tional finance stability. The model indicated that most 
of these austerity programs have to be extended by the 
IMF over a longer period of time and that the 
International Monetary Fund has to be a little more 
flexible in terms of forcing governments to cut back on 
expenditures. And again, I see no reason why the two 
necessities cannot be accommodated. That is more or less 
what is going on in Mexico right' now. The stabilization 
program probably is a little bit more severe than some of 
the forecasts we made, but on the other hand there is 
strong evidence that the economy is going to be able to 
come back, service its debt, and maintain a fairly stable 
growth pattern throughout the rest of the 1980's without 
experiencing political and social instability which a 
harsh program would have caused. 
What we are looking at in this type of modeling is 
steering the economy so that we can develop a number of 
paths over time and see what mechanisms can be put into 
place: how can we direct the economy on a path that is 
agreeable not only to the political groups in the coun-
try, but also to the international lenders and other 
people who supply capital to Mexico? I think what you 
will see in the future (again this is my own speculation) 
is that many of the harsh International Monetary Fund 
type stabilization programs which have been implemented 
in the past, and have been fairly unsuccessful, will be 
made more flexible because of the political fallout and 
also because the results of modeling exercises of this 
type indicate that unless socio-political feedbacks are 
acknowledged, failure is likely to occur. 
I think the International Monetary Fund is coming to 
accept the conclusion--or at least to understand it--that 
even problem countries like Mexico need a space of time 
to straighten out their economics; it cannot be done 
overnight. While it might be observed that Mexico is in 
a very special situation, the results are encouraging. 
They indicate that a country like Mexico, considered to 
be one of the most dire of the debt-burdened countries, 
should not have too much trouble in regaining stable 
growth if a longer term stabilization program can be 
worked out with the IMF. Indeed, Mexico may come back to 
a fairly high rate of growth in a short period of time. 
In conclusion, the International Monetary Fund is 
now thinking more in terms of longer-term stabilization 
programs. There probably has been a shift to this 
thinking because models such as the one described above 
have shown that, in the short-run, the austerity measures 
usually prescribed will be unsuccessfulgiven the present 
state of the world economy. On the other hand, the 
models suggested that medium-term austerity programs have 
proved to be quite successful and are consistent with the 
political realities of debtor countries and likely 
developments in the world economy. 
